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TAX SECTION
ELECTION OF TAX FREE INTERCORPORATE




Tax planning for the care and feeding of multiple corporate organi-
zations has taken on a completely new look as a result of the Revenue
Act of 1964. To be sure, some problems refuse to die or even fade
away-for example, the possible loss of multiple surtax exemptions
through the application of tax avoidance sections of the Code and the
decision as to whether consolidated returns are desirable. However, the
1964 Act gives these old problems some new "twists" and opens up a
veritable Pandora's box of new alternatives. On the whole, it seems clear
that the 1964 multiple corporation package can be used to advantage
by multiple groups, but careful tax planning-and a touch of omniscience
-will be required to take full advantage of the new opportunities.
The subject of this paper is the 100 percent dividends received de-
duction for corporations, one of the new alternatives open to businesses
operated in the parent-subsidiary form of multiple corporate organiza-
don. From a theoretical and technical standpoint, this provision is one
of the most interesting in the Revenue Act of 1964-although, as a prac-
tical matter, it is probable that many, if not most, multiple organizations
will find that other alternatives are more advantageous.' A significant
* This article is based upon papers presented by the author at the 10th Annual Tax
Conference of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary on
December 5, 1964, and the 17th Annual Federal Tax Conference of the University of
Chicago Law School on October 28, 1964. Certain portions of the proceedings of the
University of Chicago Law School Tax Conference (including the paper upon which
this article is based) appear in the December 1964 issue of Taxes magazine and the
author gratefully acknowledges the permission of the University of Chicago Law School
for the publication of this article in the William and Mary Law Review. The author
also wishes to express his appreciation for the aid given him in the preparation of this
article by Irving Salem and Thomas D. Terry of the Chief Counsel's Office, Internal
Revenue Service.
" AB., 1950; J.D., 1952, George Washington University. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
1. See, Dale, 1964 Act: Climate Improved for Multiple Corporations Despite Penalty
Tax, 20 JOURNAL or TAxAriov 264, 267 (1964).
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portion of the following discussion is devoted to linking the new statu-
tory provisions with the policy considerations underlying their adoption.
This is intended to bring the statutory rules into sharper focus. To
complete the picture, certain problems which the new legislation poses
for the regulations draftsmen and a few of the more important operating
problems will be discussed.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TAx ON INTERCORPORATE DIVIDENDS
The legislative history of the tax on intercorporate dividends indicates
a close relationship between the tax and the so-called "multiple surtax
exemption" problem. For a number of years before 1935, the dividend
income of corporations had been fully deductible in determining taxable
income. In 1935, the Congress revised the corporate income tax by
substituting a moderately graduated rate structure in lieu of the prior
flat uniform rate.2 In connection with this rate revision, the administra-
tion recommended that the dividend income of corporations be included
within the tax base. The following quotation from President Roosevelt's
tax message to the Congress in June 1935, is especially pertinent:
Provision should, of course, be made to prevent evasion of such
graduated tax on corporate income through the device of numerous
subsidiaries or affiliates, each of which might technically qualify as a
small concern even though all were in fact operated as a single organi-
zation. The most effective method of preventing such evasions would
be a tax on dividends received by corporations. 3
The Congress responded to this appeal by reducing the intercorporate
dividends received deduction from 100 percent to 90 percent.4 In the
Revenue Act of 1936, the graduated rates on corporate income were
increased slightly and the dividends received deduction was reduced
to 85 percent. 5 Since 1936, the dividends received deduction has re-
mained at 85 percent.'
2. REVENUE Act OF 1935, 102 (a).
3. Address by President Roosevelt to Congress, June 9, 1935, reprinted in 1939 C.B.
(Part 2) 642, 644.
4. REVENUE Acr OF 1935, 102 (h).
5. REVENUE ACT OF 1936, § 13, 26 (b). The rate structure and intercorporate dividend
tax adopted by the REvENUE AcT OF 1936 acutally superseded the corresponding provi-
sions of the REVENUE Acr oF 1935. In both cases the amendments were to be effective
for taxable years of corporations beginning after December 31, 1935.
6. There are exceptions to this general rule including, of course, the amendment made
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REVENUE Acr OF 1964
President Kennedy's recommendations to Congress in February 1963,
included a proposal to reverse the existing normal tax and surtax rates,
thus giving small corporations with taxable income of $25,000 or less
the benefit of a substantially greater rate reduction than larger corpora-
tions would receive.7 However, in order to restrict the benefits of the
surtax exemption as well as the rate reversal to the intended beneficiaries
(small business), the President recommended that the rate reversal be
"accompanied by action designed to eliminate the advantage of the
multiple surtax exemptions now available to large enterprises operating
through a chain of separately incorporated units." 8 The Treasury pro-
posed implementing the President's recommendation by allowing only
one surtax exemption to groups of corporations under common control.
This was to be accomplished over a 5-year transition period. In addi-
tion, the Treasury proposal would have imposed similar restrictions on
multiple $100,000 minimum accumulated earnings credits and multiple
$100,000 exemptions from estimated tax.
Other recommendations demonstrated that the Treasury was acutely
aware of the interrelationship of the surtax problem and the inter-
corporate dividend tax. In view of the legislative history of the 85
percent dividends received deduction and the rather complete solution
to the surtax problem which the President's recommendations would
have achieved, it is not surprising that the Treasury also recommended
that the dividends received deduction be increased to 100 percent for
intercorporate dividends among parent-subsidiary corporations which
by the REvENUE ACr OF 1964 which is the subject of this article. In addition, the con-
solidated return provisions have always permitted the elimination of othdrwise taxable
intercorporate dividends among members of an affiliated group filing consolidated re-
turns, and S 57 (b) of the TECHNiCAL AwMENDmENTs AcT OF 1958 amended 5 243 to
provide for a 100-percent dividends received deduction in the case of dividends received
by a small business investment company operating under the SMALL BusiNess INvEsr-
MENT ACr OF 1958.
7. Prior to the REvEN E ACr OF 1964, the corporate normal tax rate, which applied
to the corporation's entire taxable income, was 30 percent, and the surtax rate, applicable
only to corporate taxable income in excess of $25,000, was 22 percent. The President
recommended that the two rates of tax be switched-or "reversed"-so that the normal
rate of tax would be the lower of the two rates and the surtax would be the higher.
See, President Kennedy's Tax Message to the Congress, January 24, 1963, Hearings
Before the House Ways and Means Connnittee on the President's 1963 Tax Reconnmenda-
tions, Part 1, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 5, 14 (1963).
8. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 7, at 14.
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were subject to the new multiple corporation sanctions.9 The recom-
mendation did not endorse the total repeal of the intercorporate dividend
tax, presumably, for several reasons. First, the definition of a "parent-
subsidiary controlled group" contained in the surtax proposal was based
upon 80 percent stock ownership of a corporation by other members of
the controlled group-thus, multiple organizations based on a lesser
degree of control were not subject to the proposed sanctions. As to these
non-covered organizations, the intercorporate dividend tax would con-
tinue to serve its original purpose. Secondly, the universal repeal of the
tax would have resulted in a large revenue loss-estimated at $200 mil-
lion by the Treasury.10
The House Ways and Means Committee was impressed by the
President's recommendations in the multiple corporation area and par-
ticularly by the effect which the reversal of the corporate normal tax
and surtax would have on incentive to multiply. However, rather than
fight the many multiple groups whose expansion plans were geared to
the availability of additional surtax exemptions, the committee switched
to a penalty tax system designed only to prevent multiple groups from
increasing their tax advantage as a result of the proposed normal and
surtax rate reversal. Under the committee's system, if the multiple
group elects to retain the privilege of multiple surtax exemptions, each
corporation in the group was to be subject to a 6 percent additional tax
on its taxable income not in excess of $25,000.11
As a result of this action on the part of the Ways and Means Com-
9. Technical Implementation of the President's Recommendations Contained in His
Message on Taxation, Hearings, op. cit. supra note 7, at 81. The multiple corporation
"package" also included the proposed repeal of the additional 2 percent tax imposed on
the consolidated taxable income of an affiliated group filing a consolidated return.
See, Hearings, op. cit. supra note 7, at 81.
10. Two other points are worth noting. Complete elimination of the intercorporate
dividend tax would provide an even greater incentive for tax avoidance schemes to
avoid the personal holding company rules. Also, consider the abuse which would arise
through a combination of the interest deduction and the receipt of tax-free dividend
income arising from investment of borrowed monies. Assuming the complete elimina-
tion of the intercorporate dividend tax took the form of a 100 percent dividends re-
ceived deduction, similar to the § 243 (b) approach, § 265, relating to nondeductibility
of expenses allocable to tax-exempt income, would not apply because the dividends
received would not be "wholly exempt from the taxes imposed by subtitle A of the
Code." See Treas. Reg. (hereafter cited Reg.) § 1.265-1 (b).
1I. See § 223 of H.R. 8363 as reported by the House Ways and Means Committee,
88th Cong. The Ways and Means Committee's multiple corporation plan was ac-
cepted by the House and Senate, subject to several minor technical changes, and became
§ 2,5 of the Rr1'EwNuE ACT or 1964.
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mittee, the Treasury withdrew its support of a 100 percent dividends
received deduction for intercorporate dividends. As previously indi-
cated, the principal justification for the intercorporate dividends tax
was to prevent the use of multiple corporations. It is obvious that the
6 percent penalty system is not an effective bar to the use of multiples.
Under the penalty tax system each additional exemption is worth up
to $5,000 annually (compared to $5,500 under pre-1964 law) and it will
be possible for highly proliferated groups with total earnings in the
nillions to pay an effective rate of tax of only 28 percent. Since there is
still a need to prevent split-ups, the intercorporate dividend tax ought
to remain as an impediment. Moreover, the committee did not accept
the President's recommendations as to restrictions on multiple accumu-
lated earnings credits and exemptions from estimated tax, two other
important advantages accruing to multiple groups.
In the Senate, the Treasury did not renew the original multiple
corporation proposal or any of the other reforms jettisoned in the
House, but urged the Senate Finance Committee to act-and as swiftly
as possible-on the provisions of the House bill.'2
At this point, a group of taxpayers who were positively delighted at
the prospect of exchanging a few multiple surtax exemptions for large
amounts of tax free intercorporate dividends in line with President
Kennedy's original proposals, entered the picture. Armed with docu-
mentary proof that the Treasury supported the proposition that tax free
intercorporate dividends made good sense in cases where the advantages
of multiple incorporation were withdrawn, these taxpayers called the
Treasury's hand by offering to suffer the slings and arrows of the original
proposal in return for the tax free dividend privilege. The Treasury
at first pointed out that these taxpayers could gain their objective by
filing a consolidated return-indeed, a consolidated return without
the 2 percent penalty imposed under old law. The taxpayers answered
by pointing out that in certain situations the consolidated return alterna-
tive was not practical. Once the Treasury was assured that the new
system would prevent the taxpayers from obtaining the best of both
worlds (i.e., reap a prime consolidated return benefit, but simultaneously
retain the benefits of separate filing), the Treasury agreed and the 100
percent dividends received deduction emerged as section 214 of the
Revenue Act of 1964."3
12. See statement of Secretary Dillon, Hearings Before the Committee on Finance
of the Senate on H.R. 8363, Part I. 88th Cong, 1st Sess, 131, 143.
13. 78 Stat. 52 (1964).
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One might ask why the Treasury did not immediately snap up the
offer-after all, those electing would have to give up multiple surtax
exemptions, thus furthering the Treasury's essential purpose. However,
it is probable that the proponents of the 100 percent dividends received
deduction were rather large corporations with a few subsidiaries. The
large chains of corporations all earning $25,000 or thereabouts were not
interested in the new proposal. Of course, it ,was the latter type of chain
that most interested the Treasury.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The statutory pattern implementing the 100 percent dividends re-
ceived deduction is relatively simple. The operative provision is section
243 (a) (3) which awards a dividends received deduction of 100 per-
cent in the case of "qualifying dividends". New section 243 (b) is
devoted entirely to the definition of qualifying dividends and related
matters. In order for dividends to qualify for purposes of section 243
(a) (3), section 243 (b) (1) requires:
(1) On the day the dividends are received, the corporation receiv-
ing the dividends and the corporation paying the dividends must be
members of the same affiliated group,' 4 and
(2) The affiliated group must have made the election provided by
section 243 (b) (2) effective for the taxable years of its member
corporations which include the day the dividend is received.
These requirements are conditions precedent to qualification for the
100 percent dividends received deduction. However, even if these con-
ditions are satisfied, several other rigorous requirements must be met
before a distribution may legitimately bear the noble stamp of "qualify-
ing dividends".
"QUALIFYING" EARNINGS AND PROFITS
The definition of "qualifying dividends" includes only dividends
which are distributed out of earnings and profits of taxable years of the
distributor corporation which meet each of the following conditions:
(1) On each day of the year the distributing and recipient corpora-
tions must have been members of the same affiliated group of which
14. An "affiliated group" is defined by reference to § 1504(a) except that for purposes
of S 243 (b) any domestic insurance company subject to taxation under § 802 or 821 is
treated as an includible corporation. See § 243 (b) (5).
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they are members on the date the dividend is received by the recipient
corporation,
(2) An election under section 1562 (relating to election of multiple
surtax exemptions) must not be effective for the year, and
(3) The year must end after December 31, 1963.15
If the year fails any single requirement, the earnings for the year
become "tainted", that is, they cannot qualify for the 100 percent
deduction, only the 85 percent deduction. The policy considerations
underlying the first two conditions seem clear. The condition which
requires affiliation can be supported in general terms or in terms of a
specific abuse situation. Stripped of the technical niceties of the situa-
tion, the profits earned by an 80 percent or more owned subsidiary are
more directly the earnings of the parent and no tax should ensue when
passed up to the parent. 16 On the other hand, earnings and profits
which are attributable to non-affiliation periods will be the result of the
independent operations of the distributing corporation rather than the
result of its role as an operating cog in the business activity conducted
by the affiliated group. Accordingly, the argument can be made that
qualification for dividends paid out of these non-affiliated earnings and
profits would result in a windfall to the affiliated group.
The abuse situation referred to is the familiar "milking" of the
earnings and profits of a subsidiary by the affiliated group followed by
a sale of the subsidiary's stock. The price of the stock of a subsidiary
acquired by a member of an affiliated group will be determined, in part
at least, by the assets representing the accumulated earnings and profits
of the subsidiary on the date of the acquisition of the stock. Later dis-
tributions out of pre-affiliation earnings and profits to the subsidiary's
parent at no tax cost will cause the fair market value of the stock of the
subsidiary to fall below the level it would have been had there been no
such distribution. The stage is then set for a sale of the stock at the de-
flated fair market value and a tax loss (or a decrease in the tax gain). This
loss (or decrease in gain) would be directly attributable to the tax free
withdrawal of pre-affiliation earnings and profits of the subsidiary. The
selling shareholders which are members of the affiliated group would
enjoy the luxury of a loss, or reduction in gain, for tax purposes without
economic deprivation. This problem has been raised in connection with
consolidated returns. Thus, section 1.1502-36 (a) (2) of the consolidated
return regulations provides that no loss is allowed upon the sale or other
15. 243 (b) (1) (B).
16. See Hearings, op. cit. supra note 7, at 81.
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disposition of the stock of a member or former member of an affiliated
group to the extent that the loss is attributable to a distribution of earn-
ings and profits of the member which were accumulated before it be-
came a member of the group.'1 Observe that the consolidated return
rule is triggered only in cases where the sale of the stock of the sub-
sidiary would produce a tax loss in the absence of the protective provision.
The solution there is to deny that portion of the loss which is attributable
to post-affiliation dividends. Thus, the scope of the consolidated return
rule is mild in the face of section 243 (b)'s outright denial of the 100
percent deduction with respect to any distributions out of pre-affiliation
earnings and profits.' 8
The "tainting" of earnings and profits accumulated by the distributing
corporation in taxable years for which a multiple surtax exemption
election under section 1562 is effective, 19 of course, is the statutory ex-
pression of the underlying policy previously discussed. Since the ef-
fective date of section 1562 is for taxable years ending after December
31, 1963, at this point there is nothing which would deny the 100
percent deduction for dividends out of earnings of a pre-1963 year in
which multiple surtax exemptions were claimed. However, the third
condition for dividend qualification is a flat denial of the 100 percent
dividends received deduction in respect to dividends distributed out of
earnings and profits of taxable years ending on or before December
31, 1963. Since there are circumstances under which the members of an
affiliated group might not have had the benefit of multiple surtax ex-
emptions in taxable years ending on or before December 31, 1963-for
example, a consolidated return might have been filed-this last require-
ment represents more than an extension of the policy against permitting
the 100 percent deduction with respect to distributions out of earn-
17. The consolidated return rule is also applicable in the case of a loss on the dis-
position of bonds or obligations of a member (or former member) of the affiliated
group.
18. Although the scope of the two rules is different, the consolidated return rule is
actually harsher if, in fact, the stock of the subsidiary is sold at a loss. Thus, under § 243
(b) a 7.2 percent tax is paid with respect to the dividends received whereas under
the consolidated return rule this tax is not paid but a deduction worth 25 percent of
the dividends is lost.
19. Presumably, the multiple surtax exemption election under section 1562 may be
"effective" with respect to a taxable year of a corporation even though the 6 percent
additional tax is not applicable for the taxable year by reason of the application of
S 1562 (b) (1) (A) or (B). Cf. H. Rept. 749, 88th Cong., A-191. ("However, the
application . . . [of an exception to the imposition of the 6-percent tax] does not
constitute a termination of an election and, therefore, an election by a controlled group
would continue in effect for any succeeding year unless terminated under 5 1562 ().")
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ings and profits of "multiple surtax exemption" years. As a practical
matter, the December 31, 1963 cut-off provision probably results from
the simplicity of using a fixed cut-off date.
For purposes of determining whether any portion of a dividend dis-
tribution is out of "tainted" earnings and profits, it will be necessary
to allocate distributions to earnings and profits of particular taxable years.
In determining whether a corporate distribution is a dividend or a return
of capital, of course, there are basically only two classifications of earn-
ings and profits-current and accumulated. 20  Thus, the specific ear-
marking of distributions as out of the earnings and profits of a particular
year of a distributing domestic corporation has heretofore been un-
necessary. 21 Fortunately, the Senate Finance Committee Report does
contain expressions of congressional intent with respect to this issue,
although it leaves one with the impression that the Congress was not
aware that the allocation of the distribution to earnings and profits of
a particular year is a unique problem. The general explanation portion
of the Senate Report states:
The determination as to what earnings and profits a dividend is con-
sidered as being distributed out of will be made under the rules appli-
cable elsewhere in the Code for this purpose; i.e., they will be considered
as paid first out of the current year's earnings and profits and then, to
the extent of any excess, out of the prior year's earnings and profits,
then, to the extent of any excess, out of the second prior year's earn-
ings and profits, etc.22
ELEcrIoN
Section 243 (b) (2) provides that the 100 percent dividends received
election is to be made by the electing affiliated group's common parent
corporation with respect to a particular taxable year of the common
parent. The election must be consented to23 by the subsidiary corpora-
20. See § 316 (a).
21. See § 902 (c) which, for purposes of the foreign tax credit, gives "the Secretary
or his delegate-full power to determine from the accumulated profits of what year or
years ... dividends where paid . .,.". Cf., however, the necessity of allocating distribu-
tions to earnings and profits of a specific period or periods for purposes of §§ 243 (d) and
245 and Reg. § 1.1502-36 (a) (2) of the consolidated return regulations.
22. S. REP. 830, 88th Cong., 76. See also, S. REP. 830, Part 2, 88th Cong.. 221 (examples
(1) and (2)).
23. The third sentence of § 243 (b) (2) requires that "[E]ach corporation which is
a member of . . . [the electing affiliated group] at any time during its taxable year
which includes the last day of... [the taxable year of the common parent corporation
for which the election is made] must consent to such election . . ." (emphasis added).
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tions in the group. On April 10, 1964, the Service published temporary
regulations24 which provided the procedure to be followed in making
the election and giving the required consents. The temporary regulations
state that an election under section 243 (b) must be filed no later than
the due date (including extensions of time) for the filing of the com-
mon parent's income tax return for the first taxable year for which the
election is to be effective. 25 This is important to remember. The sec-
tion 243 (b) election, as well as the election to file consolidated returns,
are alternatives to the election of multiple surtax exemptions under sec-
tion 1562 and both must be exercised with the filing of the common
parent's return.26 It is true that section 1562 (e) permits the multiple
surtax election to be made within a 3-year period after the first year
for which the election is to be effective.27  However, taxpayers who
postpone consideration of the choices available to them until the expira-
tion of the 3-year period prescribed in section 1562 (e) will find they
have no real choice. In essence, the benefits of the 3-year look-back are
somewhat illusory.2
With respect to the required consents of all the subsidiaries, the tem-
porary regulations realistically provide that a corporation whose stock
is wholly-owned by a member or members of the electing affiliated
group is "deemed" to consent to the election.29 This provision recognizes
24. T. D. 6721, 29 F.R. 4997 (1964).
25. Reg. Sec. 19.4-1 (b) (1).
26. The consolidated return regulations require that "the privilege of making a con-
solidated return under § 1502 for any taxable year of an affiliated group must be
exercised at the time of making the return of the common parent for such year." Reg.
Sec. 1.1502-10 (a).
27. § 1562 (e) (1) provides that the election shall be made at any time before the
expiration of 3 years after ". . . the date when the income tax return for the taxable
year of the component member of the controlled group which has the taxable year
ending first on or after the specified December 31 is required to be'filed (without regard
to any extensions of time)."
28. The 3-year look-back is of some help insofar as the choice between § 1561 (appor-
tionment of a single surtax exemption) and § 1562 is concerned. In deciding whether to
apportion a single surtax exemption under § 1561 or elect multiple surtax exemptions
under § 1562, the look-back permits controlled groups to take into account adjustments
made to the taxable incomes of its members before the running of the 3-year statute of
limitations on the assessment of deficiencies.
29. Reg. § 19.4-1 (b) (2) (ii). The Service has also adopted a "deemed consent"
procedure for purposes of consents to the apportionment of the single $100,000 exemp-
tion from estimated tax available to electing affiliated groups under § 243 (b) (3) (C) (v)
(Reg. § 19.4-1 (c) (2) (iii) and (3) (iii)). See also Reg. § 1.46-1 (f) (2) (i) (re-
lating to consents to the apportionment of the $25,000 limitation on the allowable in-
vestment credit among members of an affiliated group) and Reg. § 19.5-1 (b) (1) and
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that the requirement of consent from wholly-owned subsidiaries would
be no more than a pure formality. The presumed consent should relieve,
to some extent, the problems of "overlooking" dormant subsidiaries
which, for example, are kept "alive" solely for the purposes of reserving
the corporate name under state law.
In contrast to the consolidated return rules, corporations which are
members of the electing affiliated group are not required to use the same
taxable years. Consequently, for purposes of determining the taxable
years which are affected by the election the statute "matches" the tax-
able years of the members by using the last day of the common parent's
year as a "peg." 1o For example, assume the common parent corporation
uses a calendar year, and its subsidiary uses a fiscal year ending Novem-
ber 30. If the group makes an election with respect to the taxable year
of the common parent ending on December 31, 1965, the election will
be effective for that taxable year and the taxable year of the subsidiary
ending on November 30, 1966. (The taxable year which includes the
last day of the common parent's taxable year.) Once a valid election
has been made, it has a continuing effect until the affiliated group affects
a termination.
TERMINATION
Section 243 (b) (4) provides two methods of terminating the 100
percent dividends received election. As a practical matter, the termina-
tion of the election will only occur when the controlling interests of the
affiliated group find it advantageous to terminate. Thus, under one
method, the mutual consent of all the corporations which are members
of the affiliated group will work a termination3' and, under the second.
method, a corporation which is a new member of the group may file.
a refusal to consent to an election previously made by the group.32
Since, by definition, 80 percent of the stock of any new member of the
group will be owned by a member or members of the group, the second
method is no less a "voluntary" termination than the first method.
(2) (relating to consents to the apportionment of the single $25,000 surtax exemption
available under section 1561 (a) to members of a controlled group of corporations).
30. Cf. the use of "December 31" as a peg for purposes of the new multiple surtax
exemption provisions. See §§ 1561 (a) and 1562 (a). The difference is probably due
to the fact that a "controlled group of corporations" as defined in § 1563 includes, inter
alia, brother-sister related corporations which are determined by reference to an in-
dividual, estate, or trust, rather than a common parent corporation.
31. § 243 (b) (4) (A).
32. § 243 (b) (4) (B).
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There would also appear to be a third method of termination which,
although not specifically stated in the statute, is implicit in the statutory
plan. If the electing affiliated group goes out of existence, for example,
as a result of the common parent selling the stock of the subsidiaries,
presumably the election will also expire.33 Moreover, the stautory pro-
visions specifically relating to termination deal only with situations
where the election is terminated for the affiliated group as a whole.
What about the "termination" of an election with respect to an
individual corporation which ceases to be a member of an electing af-
filiated group as a result of a decrease in the percentage of its stock
owned by the continuing members of the electing group? Since the
corporation is no longer a member of the affiliated group, and the elec-
tion can be effective only with respect to a taxable year of a "member
of the affiliated group".. 4 the termination of the election with respect
to the departing member is clearly implicit in the statute.
The temporary regulations provide that a section 243 (b) election,
once filed, is irrevocable and is not subject to termination under section
243 (b) (4) with respect to the taxable year of the common parent
corporation for which the election is made. 35 Thus, once an election
is perfected with respect to a particular taxable year of the common
parent corporation, it will necessarily be effective for at least that taxable
year (and the taxable years of the subsidiaries which include the last day
of that year). However, there are no restrictions on the termination of
the election with respect to subsequent taxable years comparable to the
provisions of the consolidated return regulations which permit the
members of the affiliated group which once file consolidated returns
to return to separate filing only under certain circumstances. 36 The
restrictions of the consolidated return regulations undoubtedly reflect,
to some extent, the Treasury's conviction that the consolidated method
of reporting produces a conceptually correct measure of the operations
of the affiliated group as a whole, and once adopted, should be con-
tinued in the absence of special circumstances. Moreover, the transition
from consolidated returns to separate returns present some difficult
administrative problems. As respects the 100 percent dividends re-
ceived election, transition is apparently no problem and the advantages
33. For purposes of the multiple surtax exemption provisions, there is a specific statu-
tory provision for termination in cases where the "controlled group of corporations"
goes out of existence. See S 1562 (c) (4).
34. See § 243 (b) (2) (A) and (B).
35. See the last sentence of Reg. § 19.4-1 (b) (1).
36. See Reg. § 1.1502-11 (a).
[Vol. 6:167
INTERCORPORATE DIVIDENDS
to be gained from a "locking in" policy are not nearly as great. Thus,
this "free exit" policy plus the absence of any statutory restrictions on
reelection 37 means that the 100 percent dividends received deduction
is available on a year-by-year basis. But note that if the group elects
multiple surtax exemption for the "out" year, any earnings accruing in
such year are not eligible for the 100 percent deduction.
The statutory provision relating to the termination of the 100 per-
cent election by mutual consent of the members of the affiliated group
provides that the termination shall be perfected in the same general
manner that the election is initially perfected-that is, by the filing of
a termination and consents to the termination.
EFFECT OF ELECTION
In return for the tax free intercorporate dividend privilege, the
members of an electing affiliated group are required to forego certain
tax advantages which they ordinarily would enjoy as corporations
filing separate returns. Aside from the surtax exemption limitations,
and the limitation relating to exemptions from estimated tax and mini-
mum accumulated earnings credits, the limitations and restrictions im-
posed on electing affiliated groups by section 243 (b) (3) affect some
rather esoteric phases of the determination of corporate tax liability.
It is true that in the case of affiliated groups engaged in certain specialized
kinds of business activity, the restrictions may be real deterrents to the
section 243 (b) election. Nevertheless, it may be that the precedent
value of these limitations on related corporations will prove to be more
important than the revenue involved.
The restrictions and limitations imposed on electing affiliated groups
by section 243 (b) (3) are:
(1) No member of the group may consent to an election under
section 1562.
(2) The members of the group must make the same choices respect-
ing the foreign tax credit versus the deduction of foreign taxes and, in
the event the foreign tax credit is chosen, all must choose either the
per-country or the over-all limitation, and
(3) The members of the electing group are limited in the aggregate,
to one $100,000 minimum accumulated earnings credit,38 one $100,00039
37. Cf. the 5-year prohibition against reelection of multiple surtax exemptions con-
tained in § 1562 (d).
38. See § 535 (c) (2) and (3).
39. See § 615 (a) and (b).
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and $400,00040 limitation for exploration expenditures, one $25,000
limitation on small business deduction of life insurance companies,41 and
one $100,000 exemption for purposes of estimated tax filing.42
These particular items were selected as the result of a canvass of the
consolidated return regulations. Generally, the limitations included in
section 243 (b) (3) are applicable to an affiliated group of corporations
filing a consolidated return, albeit in the case of the provision relating
to exemptions from estimated tax the consolidated return regulations give
the group the option to file on the basis of multiple exemptions.43 As to
this latter discrepancy, the Internal Revenue Service consolidated return
experts are presently examining the background of this option to de-
termine whether the rule is justifiable in the light of the general theory
of consolidated filing.
Notice that for purposes of applying the limitations, it will not be
necessary to compute an "aggregate taxable income" for the electing
affiliated group as a whole. This is siguificant because several of the
limitations applicable to affiliated groups filing consolidated returns are
computed by reference to the consolidated taxable income of the group.
For example, an affiliated group's consolidated charitable contribution
deduction is limited to 5 percent of the aggregate taxable income of the
group computed with certain modifications. 44 One reason for avoiding
limitations of this nature for purposes of section 243 (b) is that the mem-
bers of an electing affiliated group are permitted to use different taxable
years. If the computation of an "aggregate taxable income" for an
electing section 243 group was a necessary step in determining the
amount of a deduction to be taken by a member of such group on its
separate tax return, extremely difficult filing problems would emerge.
For example, how could a calendar year taxpayer appropriately file its
return until it received the results of the "matching year" of another
member of the group whose matching year ends November 30.
The Senate Finance Committee report explains the manner of ap-
portioning these fixed amounts. It states that, "except for the $100,000
40. See § 615 (c) (1).
41. See § 804 (a) (4) and 809 (d) (10).
42. See §§ 6016 and 6655.
43. Reg. § 1.1502-10 (c). The Senate Finance Committee apparently overlooked this
consolidated return provision. See S. REP. 830, 88th Cong., 76. ("Where an affiliated
group elects the 100 percent dividend paid treatment, the members of the group must
forego certain advantages which they otherwise would have as separate corporations.
These rights are withdrawn since they are not available to a group filing a consolidated
return....")
44. Reg. § 1.1502-31 (a) (1) (i) (c).
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:minimum accumulated earnings credit, it is anticipated that the mem-
bers of the affiliated group will be permitted to apportion the $100,000
-exemptions, limitations, or the $400,000 limitation in any manner they
-see fit." 45 Since the affiliated group is not permitted to elect multiple
surtax exemptions under section 1562, the group will necessarily be
subject to the provisions of section 1561 which specifically permits the
allocation of a single $25,000 surtax exemption in accordance with an
,apportionment plan. 46 The reason for the Senate Finance Committee's
reservation with respect to an unequal apportionment of the $100,000
minimum accumulated earnings credit is based upon the Committee's
fear that the shifting of the $100,000 credit could produce results which
are inconsistent with the purposes of the accumulated earnings tax.47
As to the actual mechanics of effecting an apportionment of the
various restrictions and limitations, we must await publication of the
proposed regulations on this subject. The temporary regulations issued
last April do, however, contain interim rules respecting the apportion-
ment of a single $100,000 exemption from estimated tax.48 Two aspects
of these rules are of particular interest. First, the temporary regulations
are quite clear that the affiliated group as a whole will be permitted a
single $100,000 exemption from estimated tax for the taxable years of
its members which include the last day of the taxable year of the common
parent corporation for which the election is initially made. This means
that if the members of an affiliated group file declarations of estimated
45. S. R p. 830, 88th Cong., 77.
46. See § 1561 (a) (2) and Reg. § 19.5-1 (b) (temporary regulations relating to the
apportionment of the $25,000 surtax exemption for taxable years including December
31, 1963).
47. A proposed statutory draft dealing with the limitation of minimum accumulated
earnings credits in the case of multiple corporate groups was developed in 1958 by a
joint study group of the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association in
connection with a proposed solution to the multiple corporation problem. In rejecting
the possibility of a "consent" apportionment of a single $100,000 minimum accumulated
earnings credit among the members of the multiple corporate group, the study group
observed: "It is proposed that this minimum credit be allocated equally among members
of the group at the close of the taxable year of a member if a consolidated return is
not filed. Such a provision is analogous to the general rule provided for the allocation
of the surtax exemption among members of an affiliated group. It is recognized that
such an allocation may be somewhat arbitrary, but it does not appear to be feasible to
allow an election among the group as is provided as an alternative in the surtax exemp-
tion area. Such an election here could lead to tax avoidance"' ALI, FEDERAL INCOME,
ESTATE AND GIFT TAx PROJECT, Income Tax Problems of Corporations and Sharebolders,
Report of Working Views of a Study by the ALI Staff and ABA Section of Taxation
Liaison Conmtittee, October 31, 1958, Part Six, Multiple Corporations, 391.
48. Reg. § 19.4-1 (c) (2) and (3).
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tax on the basis of separate $100,000 exemptions and make estimated
tax payments on that basis, and later make a 100 percent dividends
received election which is initially effective with respect to these taxable
years, the members will probably incur additions to tax under section
6655 resulting from the underpayments. This is so, according to the
temporary regulations, whether or not the affiliated group anticipated
making the 100 percent election at the time the declarations of estimated
tax were filed or the payments on the declarations were made.49 If the
group does anticipate making an election which will be initially effec-
tive with respect to the current taxable years of its members, these addi-
tions to tax can be avoided by filing declarations for those years and
making payments on the basis of a single exemption. If the group
eventually decides against making the election, however, it is not com-
pensated (in the form of interest) for having paid too much tax in
advance. The temporary regulations do not require the formal appor-
tionment of the single $100,000 exemption available to the electing
group at the time the declarations of estimated tax are actually filed,
but provide that the apportionment plan (and the consents of the sub-
sidiaries to the plan) is to be filed with the final income tax return of the
common parent. This liberal rule is simply a reflection of the fact that
the Internal Revenue Service is not really interested in how the $100,000
is split up until the tax returns are filed and the additions to tax are de-
termined.
REGULATIONS PROBLEMS
The new section 243 (b) raises several interesting problems of statu-
tory interpretation. The following issues have been selected for discus-
sion because the considerations involved in their resolution illustate the
approach the Internal Revenue Service takes in developing proposed
regulations under a new statutory provision.
Section 243 (b) (1) (B) restricts the concept of "qualifying divi-
dends" to dividends "distributed out of earnings and profits of a taxable
year of the distributing corporation" which satisfies each of the condi-
tions previously described. The statute is precise in its reference to a tax-
able year of the distributing corporation. But what if the distributing cor-
poration succeeds to the earnings and profits of a predecessor corporation
as a result of a reorganization. To complete the hypothetical, assume that
if the predecessor corporation had remained in existence and made the
49. See Reg. § 19.4-1 (c) (6), example (2).
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distribution itself, the distribution would have qualified under section
243 (b). In other words, the issue is whether the phrase used in section
243 (b) (1) (B)-"a taxable year of the distributing corporation"-
should be interpreted to qualify dividends distributed out of earnings
and profits of a taxable year of a corporation the earnings and profits
of which the distributing corporation succeeds to under section 381.
It would appear that the Service could justify adopting a strict position
here on the grounds that section 243 (b) is in the nature of a relief
provision and, under a well accepted canon of statutory interpretation,
relief provisions are subject to a strict construction. On the other hand,
the strict position would seem to create an unnecessary tax barrier in the
road of corporate reorganizations and liquidations which would other-
wise be undertaken as a result of sound business judgment. These are
the types of factors the regulations draftsmen must weigh in reaching
a final decision.
A second interesting regulatory problem may be illustrated by the
following example: Suppose a calendar-year corporation first becomes
a member of an electing section 243 (b) affiliated group during the
month of December. Assume that the common parent of this group
(which has several other subsidiaries) is also a calendar-year taxpayer.
Under section 243 (b) (1) (B) (i), the parent and the subsidiary must
be members of the same affiliated group on each day of the taxable year
of the subsidiary if dividends paid out of the earnings and profits of such
year by the subsidiary are to qualify for the 100 percent deduction. In
this example, then, any dividends paid by the subsidiary out of the earn-
ings and profits of the year it became a member of the group will not
qualify. Nevertheless, under section 243 (b) (2), the election is effec-
tive for this taxable year. Since the election is effective, does this mean
that the various limitations and restrictions contained in section 243 (b)
(3) (the disadvantageous effects of the election) apply? If so, the rather
odd result is that this later-acquired subsidiary must suffer the detriments
associated with the election but cannot distribute a qualifying dividend.
The Service will consider this apparent anomaly carefully in exercising
the broad regulatory authority granted under section 243 (b) (3).
Finally, consider the following problem which arises as a result of
including certain insurance companies as members of an "affiliated
group" for section 243 (b) purposes.5 0 For consolidated return pur-
50. § 243 (b) (5). Note the gyrations the draftsmen had to go through in § 243 (b)
(6) to achieve the desired correlation between the multiple surtax exemption provisions
and the 100-percent dividends received deduction insofar as insurance companies are con-
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poses, life insurance companies are not considered "includible" corpora-
dons, that is, they cannot join in the filing of a consolidated return un-
less the affiliated group consists solely of life insurance companies.
Assume a life insurance company owns all the stock of a non-insurance
corporation which, in turn, owns all the stock of another non-insurance
corporation. All three of these corporations would be members of an
affiliated group for purposes of the 100 percent dividends received
election. Suppose that the two non-insurance corporations join in the
filing of a consolidated return. Can the section 243 (b) affiliated group
(including all three corporations) elect the 100 percent dividends re-
ceived provision and, thus, pass tax-free dividends from'the non-insur-
ance corporations to the insurance company? The stat1te and accom-
panying committee reports do not specifically address themselves to
the possibility of a simultaneous section 243 and consolidated return
election but, in view of the fact that the 100 percent dividends received
election was conceived as an alternative to consolidated returns, a
strong argument can be made to the effect that mutual exclusivity was
intended. At the present time, the Service is studying this factual
pattern carefully to determine if there are any tax avoidance possibili-
ties created by permitting the 100 percent dividends received election
under these circumstances.
MINORITY INTERESTS
An interesting problem which the new 100 percent dividends re-
ceived deduction election raises is the effect of the election on the rights
cerned. Briefly, the problem was this: § 1563 (a), which defines "controlled group of
corporations" for purposes of the multiple corporation nrovisions, "carves out" insurance
companies subject to taxation under § 802 or 821 from controlled groups described in
§ 1563 (a) (1), (2), or (3), and treats the companies as members of a separate insurance
group under § 1563 (a) (4). Thus, these "carved out" insurance groups are entitled to-
share a single $25,000 surtax exemption under §. 1561, while the non-insurance company
members of the controlled group described in 1563 (a) (1), (2), or (3) share another
$25,000 surtax exemption pursuant to § 1561. § 243 (b) (6) (A), in effect, reverses this
"carving out" process and treats the insurance companies and non-insurance companies
as members of the same group for purposes of applying § 1561 to an affiliated group
electing § 243 (b). Thus, an electing affiliated group which includes insurance com-
panies will be entitled to a single surtax exemption instead of two. § 243 (b) (6) (B),
in effect, disqualifies dividends of insurance company members of an electing affiliated
group which includes insurance and non-insurance companies (or a mixture of § 802
and 821 companies) unless the dividend is distributed out of earnings and profits of a
taxable year for which an election under § 243 (b) is effective,-in other words, a tax-
able year which is subject to the § 243 (b) (6) (A) rules. For an example, see S. REP_
830, Part 2, 88th Cong., 224.
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of minority shareholders of a subsidiary member of the electing affiliated
group. If the subsidiary owns no stock in other corporations which
are members of the group, the single tax benefit flowing from the elec-
tion, the 100 percent deduction for dividends received, will inure
entirely to the other members of the group who receive dividends from
the subsidiary, and any minority shareholders in the subsidiary will
receive no tax benefit whatsoever. On the other hand, its minority
shareholders will suffer a proportionate share of the detriments flowing
from the election since the restrictions and limitations contained in sec-
tion 243 (b) (3) will adversely affect all shareholders of the subsidiary.
Under these circumstances, it seems doubtful that the minority share-
holders will permit this situation to continue very long without in-
sisting upon some participation in the tax benefits flowing from the
election. At the very minimum, the minority may attempt, on behalf
of his subsidiary, to secure compensation for the tax advantages it gave
up as a result of the election. Moreover, it appears that if the minority
cannot achieve their goal peaceably, they have an excellent chance of
satisfaction by taking the majority shareholders into court. As a Federal
court has said, majority shareholders:
Owe to the minority the duty to exercise good faith, care, and
diligence to make the property of the corporation in his charge pro-
duce the largest possible amount, to protect the interest of the holders
of the minority of the stock and to secure and deliver to them their
just portion of income and of the proceeds of the property.5'
Perhaps if the "good faith" element of this standard is emphasized, ma-
jority shareholders could be considered as not in violation of their duty
to the minority so long as the election permitted by the statute is made
without a conscious desire on the part of the majority to "freeze out"
the minority, or with any like sinister motives.52 However, most of the
recent decisions in this area of the law of corporate-stockholder rela-
tionships seem to impose a duty on the majority shareholders to act in
the best interest of all the shareholders. These cases recognize a cause
of action on behalf of the minority if the actions of the majority favor
themselves or some other group, regardless of a "good faith" motive for
51. Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 144 Fed. 765, 771 (CCA 8th, 1906).
52. See Barrett v. Denner Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del.), aff'd 146 F.2d 701
(CCA 3d. 1944); McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S. 2d 253, 262 (Sup.
Ct. 1945); BAui-ANEnr, CORPORATiONS 278 (1946).
1965]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
doing so. 3 In other words, the recent decisions require equality of
treatment or fairness to the minority in a very strict sense.
For the most part, tax legislation has left these problems of stock-
holder relationships to the controlling state law. This is so even though
many provisions of the Code sorely tempt majority shareholders to act
in disregard of the best interest of the minority. 4 Since the problem
raised here is not essentially a tax problem, only one additional observa-
tion would seem to be appropriate. Assuming that the controlling cor-
porate shareholders of the subsidiary desire to make the 100 percent
dividends received election and, in order to meet the standard of fairness
to the minority shareholders decide to allocate a portion of the total tax
savings resulting from the election to the subsidiary, what allocation is
likely to be considered to be fair by the courts? It would appear logical
that the minimum amount which could be allocated to the subsidiary
and still meet the fairness standard would be the amount determined by
allocating to each member of the affiliated group that portion of the total
tax savings which equals the tax detriment which the member suffered
by consenting to the election. As a practical matter, the exact measure-
ment of the tax detriment suffered may be extremely difficult. For
example, should the calculation assume that in the absence of a section
243 (b) election a multiple surtax exemption election would have been
effective or a consolidated return would have been filed?
Since the election would not have been made by the affiliated group
unless the total tax savings to the entire group were greater than the total
tax detriment incurred, the suggested allocation will leave a surplus of
tax savings. As to this surplus, it has been argued that the full amount
should be allocated to the parent.55 After all, the argument goes, the
parent by maintaining its investment in the subsidiary made possible
the tax saving election and, as a result of receiving the dividends, did
actually "realize" the savings in the tax sense. On the other hand, it
can be argued that the subsidiary holds the "key" to the tax savings
"lock". That is, the tax savings could never be realized unless the sub-
55. Case v. N.Y. Central Railroad Company, 243 N.Y.S. 2d 620 (1963), Bennett v. Brueil
Petroleum Corp, 99 A.2d 236 (Del. Ch. 1953), Mendelson v. Leather Mfg. Co., 326 Mass.
226,93 NE. 2d 537 (1950).
54. See, the new amendment to the collapsible corporation provisions, § 341 (f), added
by S I of P.L. 88-484. But cf. the concern for minority shareholders expressed by S 337
(d).
55. Cf. the argument made in Case v. N.Y. Central Railroad Company, op. cit. spra
note 53, at 624.
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sidiary has earnings and profits to distribute and, accordingly, a portion
of the surplus tax savings should be allocated to the subsidiary.
OPERATING PROBLEMS
In most cases, the 100 percent dividends received deduction election
is only one of four possibilities open to parent-subsidiary related corpora-
tions as a result of the Revenue Act of 1964. The other three alterna-
tives are:
(1) Multiple surtax exemption election under section 1562.
(2) Consolidated returns.
(3) Apportion a single surtax exemption under section 1561.
Now that the 1964 legislation has been on the books for almost a
year, corporate tax advisors-particularly the accountants-have de-
veloped, or are in the process of developing, mathematical formulas
for use in determining which of the four alternatives will provide the
maximum tax advantage under various circumstances. Thus, a multiple
organization, which for reasons to be mentioned shortly decides against
filing a consolidated return, will be vitally interested in the level of
intercorporate dividends which must be generated by the group in
order to make the 100 percent dividends received alternative as attractive
as the election of multiple surtax exemptions under section 1562. This
"break-even" level of dividend flow can be determined by dividing the
net tax savings resulting from the multiple surtax exemption election by
the effective tax rate on intercorporate dividends in the absence of the
100-percent dividends received election. The first element of this
formula, the total tax savings from multiple exemptions, is determined
by multiplying the number of corporations in the group less 1 by $5,000
and reducing the result by $1,500.56 The second factor, the effective
tax rate on intercorporate dividends, will be 7.2 percent in the case of
post-1964 taxable years. 57 For example, assume a multiple organization
consisting of 10 corporations each of which has taxable income in excess
of $25,000. In this case, the total tax savings per year resulting from a
56. This calculation assumes that each corporation in the group has taxable income of
at least $25,000. It also assumes that each corporation's surtax exemption can withstand
an attack by the Commissioner under the tax avoidance provisions of the Code. See,
especially, § 1551 as amended by § 235 (b) of the REvENuE ACT OF 1964.
57. This calculation assumes that the recipient corporation has taxable income of at
least $25,000. The 7.2 percent figure is arrived at by multiplying the percentage of
intercorporate dividends subject to tax, or 15 percent, by the overall corporate tax
rate, 48 percent.
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multiple surtax exemption election is $43,500, determined by multiply-
ing 9 times $5,000 ($45,000) and subtracting $1,500 from the result
($45,000 - $1,500 = $43,500). The "break-even" point, then, is
$604,166, or $43,500 divided by 7.2 percent ($43,500 = $604,166)
( .072
The calculation of the "break-even" point of dividend flow is essen-
tial, but is only a preliminary step in the complete analysis. First, the
break-even figure does not take into account the disadvantages in-
volved in the 100 percent election other than the sacrifice of multiple
surtax exemptions. In many cases, the only other disadvantage which
will be applicable will be the payment of estimated taxes on the basis
of a single $100,000 exemption rather than multiple exemptions. The
sacrifice here, of course, is not in terms of increlsed tax liability but the
interest lost due to the necessity of accelerated payments. As the cur-
rent payment provisions of the Revenue Act of 1964 phase in, the loss
of multiple exemptions from estimated tax will become more and more
costly.5 In the case of multiple organizations which include corpora-
tions engaged in improperly accumulating surplus, foreign operations,
exploration activities, or the life insurance business, still other limitations
are applicable and should be taken into consideration.
Another point which should be considered in using the "break-even"
figure is that the failure to pay dividends equal to, or greater than, the
indicated level in each year the election is in effect does not necessarily
foreclose the possibility that the 100 percent election is most advanta-
geous. Since distributions of accumulated earnings and profits, provided
the earnings and profits are not "tainted", will qualify for the 100 per-
cent deduction, large distributions of earnings and profits which were
earned in prior years will tend to make up for the failure to distribute
such accumulations in prior years. Thus, the break-even point repre-
sents an average level of distributions which must be maintained over a
period of time, rather than a year-by-year test.
CONSOLIDATED RETURNS
Since the 100 percent dividends received election only bestows upon
a multiple organization one of the several advantages of consolidated
returns and, conversely, extracts from the organization several important
disadvantages of consolidated filing, why would a group of corporations
ever elect the 100 percent dividends received deduction in preference to
58. See § 6154, as amended by § 122 (a) of the REVENUE Acr OF 1964.
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consolidated returns? This question is particularly appropriate as a
result of the repeal of the 2 percent additional tax on consolidated re-
turns by the Revenue Act of 1964. Except in unusual circumstances,
it is likely that the multiple organization which is willing to forego
multiple surtax exemptions will elect consolidated returns rather than
the 100 percent dividends received deduction. Even the elimination
of tax on intercorporate dividends, the single consolidated return ad-
vantage which is available to groups electing the 100 percent deduction,
is a limited version of the consolidated return treatment of intercorporate
dividends due to the "tainting" of earnings and profits previously de-
scribed. Notwithstanding the fact that consolidated returns have the
potential for far greater tax savings, there are certain aspects of con-
solidated filing which may, in special cases, cause a multiple group to
elect the 100 percent deduction. For example:
(1) As previously indicated, each corporation joining in the filing of
a consolidated return must use the same accounting period.59 In fact,
in arguing the case for a 100 percent dividends received election before
the Senate Finance Committee, it was this particular aspect of con-
solidated filing which the proponents of the election found to be the
most onerous. The cost and inconvenience involved in conforming
fiscal years as required by the consolidated return regulations may in-
deed be a problem-particularly in situations where the members of the
multiple group are engaged in different businesses and their natural
business years do not correspond.
(2) For affiliated groups which have been filing separate returns,
the inventory adjustments required by the regulations for the first con-
solidated return year may be a tough pill to swallow.60 Although the
double tax which results from the required adjustment is theoretically
balanced by a compensating adjustment to opening inventories for the
first year when the members of the group return. to separate filing, in
practice it is far from certain that this quid pro quo will be sufficient
to fully compensate for the initial adjustment.
(3) Apparently, the filing of consolidated returns, for Federal income
tax purposes, can increase the possibility of disputes over allocation of
income to the states for multiple organizations engaged in multi-state
operations with resulting increases in aggregate state income tax liabili-
ties.
59. Reg. § 1.1502-14.
60. Reg. § 1.1502-39.
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In some cases, other disadvantages of consolidated returns may make
the 100 percent dividends received deduction an attractive alternative. 61
One additional comment on consolidated returns. The Internal Rev-
enue Service has recently undertaken the awesome task of revising the
consolidated return regulations. The primary purpose of the revision
is to make the regulations more intelligible. The essential implementing
tool will be the liberal use of examples. 62 In some of the abuse areas, 63
substantive changes will be made, but the main focus is on clarifying
the existing rules. If the Service is successful in its efforts, this factor
alone should cause many groups of multiple corporations to take another
long look at the advantages of consolidated filing.
CONCLUSION
Needless to say, this discussion is only intended to serve as an intro-
duction to the new 100 percent dividends received deduction. The
purpose is to provide the tax practitioner with a "feel" for the new
provision. This should be of some help in appraising the utility of the
provisions against the background of the needs of corporate clients.
Of course, more definitive help is on the way-in the form of the pro-
posed regulations on this subject. Obviously, the Revenue Act of 1964
coming on the heels of the 1962 Act has placed a certain amount of
stress on the regulatory process, but the entire Treasury Department
is taking its responsibilities in this process quite seriously. The 100
percent dividends received deduction regulations have been assigned a
high priority and their publication can be expected, in proposed form,
in the near future.
61. For example, the netting of § 1231 gains and losses which occurs as a result of
filing consolidated returns. For a complete discussion of the disadvantages of consoli-
dated filing, see TAx MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO, Consolidated Returns-Elections and
Filing, No. 21 (1963) at 21 and PEE!., CONSOLTDATED TAx RETURNS 16 (1959).
62. The entire consolidated return regulations now contain only two examples. See
Reg. § 1.1502-13 (h) (2).
63. See, Henry C. Beck Builders, Inc., et al. 41 T.C. 616 (1964).
[Vol. 6:167
